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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF JURISDICTION 
This case presents an appeal of the final judgment entered 
in the trial court by the Honorable Judge David L. Mower, in 
the Criminal Department of the Tenth Circuit Court for Kane 
County, Utah, on October 8, 1987, and of that same Court's 
Order, dated December 14, 1987, denying the Defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the authority of Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the provisions of Utah Code Section 78-2a-3, sub-
section (2)(c) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Three issues are presented by this appeal: 
1) Were the constitutional rights of the Defendant, pro-
tected by both the Constitution of the State of Utah and the 
Constitution of the United States of America, to due process 
of the law, to present a defense on his behalf in person and 
by counsel, and to a fair trial of the criminal charges brought 
against him, abridged, infringed, prejudiced, and ultimately 
denied as a result of the negligence and/or incompetence of 
Defendant's counsel in failing to subpoena witnesses to testify 
in the Defendant's behalf and in failing to insure that the 
charges against the Defendant were tried before an impartial 
jury? 
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2) Did the Tenth Circuit Court for Kane County, Utah, 
commit error in refusing to accept the Defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial on the grounds that 
the Court lost jurisdiction over the case because the Defendant 
had filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals? 
3) Were the Defendant's constitutional rights to due 
process of the law denied when the Tenth Circuit Court for 
Kane County, Utah, failed to provide me with any notice of 
a hearing on my Motion to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a 
New Trial, thus preventing me from having my day in court 
and from having the opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ment for the Court's consideration prior to the entry of the 
Court's Order? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1) Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
2) Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12. 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in 
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
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money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeo-
pardy for the same offense." 
United States Constitution, Amendment V. 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI. 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartia 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for 
his defence." 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section I. 
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jursidiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
During the late summer of 1986, when the Defendant 
was employed at the Bullfrog Marina on Lake Powell, the alleged 
victim, Ed Klatenback, while in an intoxicated state, appeared 
at the Defendant's trailer and began creating a disturbance 
with another party who was at the Defendant's trailer* The 
Defendant asked the alleged victim to leave several times and 
he continued in his refusal. Without provocation, Mr. Klatenback 
threw the liquid contents of a container he had been holding in 
his hand into the face of the Defendant. Defendant instinctively 
struck back at Klatenback, hitting him twice in the head and 
knocking him to the ground. The Defendant then helped Klatenback 
get back up, apologized for hitting him, explained that he didn't 
want any trouble and that Klatenback should leave as he had been 
asked to do several times, and went into his trailer to get a 
wet rag for Klatenback as his mouth was bleeding. Klatenback 
then proceeded to leave, but before reaching his vehicle he fell 
to the pavement striking his face directly on the pavement. The 
Defendant was not in close proximity to Klatenback at the time 
he fell on the pavement, either from a physical standpoint or a 
causal standpoint. 
The Defendant was subsequently charged with Assault under 
Utah Code Section 76-5-102(1)(a), a class B Misdemeanor. His 
defense to the charges was self-defense with respect to his 
striking of Klatenback after Klatenback threw his drink into 
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the Defendant's face and absolute denial with respect to Klaten-
back's fall on the pavement. 
The original trial of this action occurred in the Justice 
Court of Kane County. The Defendant's witnesses did not appear 
because of transportation problems and the Defendant was convicted 
of the offense of Assault, not on the basis of the Defendant's 
striking of Klatenback, which was found justified on the grounds 
of self-defense, but because Klatenback and his friend testified 
that the Defendant shoved Klatenback from his property causing 
him to fall to the pavement and sustain injuries. 
The Defendant then hired Ms. Elizabeth Joseph, an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, to represent him 
in an appeal of the original trial. Because of the testimony 
of Klatenback and his friend at the original trial and the De-
fendant's knowledge that at least four (4) other witnesses saw 
the entire incident and would testify contrary to that of Klaten-
back and his witness and would corroborate the Defendant's version 
of the facts, the Defendant provided the names and either the 
addresses or relevant employment and residence information con-
cerning these witnesses to his attorney so that these witnesses 
could be secured for his new trial. Defendant also made it clear 
to his attorney that he wanted a jury trial. 
Prior to the trial de novo in the Tenth Circuit Court in 
Kane County, Utah, the Defendant's attorney either failed to 
demand a jury trial or waived the Defendant's right to a jury 
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trial. Further, Defendant's attorney failed to subpoena any 
of the witnesses whose names had been provided to her. Even 
though she had been in contact with one witness, who indicated 
that he would appear and testify, that witness was not subpoenaed* 
When he failed to appear at trial, because of what was later 
learned to be transportation and weather problems, the Defendant 
had no witnesses other than himself and was without just grounds 
to request a continuance for the failure of a subpoenaed witness 
to appear for trial. Defendant was again convicted of the charge 
on basically the same testimony of Klatenback and his friend, un-
controverted by any witness except the Defendant. The trial was 
to the Court and not to a jury, as the Defendant's attorney had 
determined, upon her own judgment, that a trial to the Court was 
preferable. The Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County entered its 
Judgment, Sentence, and Order of Probation on October 8, 1987. 
The Defendant understood, from a telephone call with court 
personnel at the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County that he 
had 30 days within which to file for a new trial. In early 
November, 1987, the Defendant filed both his Motion to Set Aside 
Conviction and to Grant a New Trial and his Notice of Appeal 
with the Tenth Circuit Court. A response, objecting to the Motion, 
was filed by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant's Motion 
proceeded to hearing on December A, 1987, and was denied by 
the Court because the Court had lost jurisdiction because the 
Defendant had already filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah 
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Court of Appeals. In fact, Defendant's Notice of Appeal was 
not filed with the Court of Appeals until January 4, 1988(See 
Exhibit C to the Defendant's previously filed Docketing Statement) 
The Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County never notified the 
Defendant of the hearing upon his Motion to Set Aside Conviction 
and to Grant a New Trial, Defendant never received actual or con-
structive notice of that hearing, and the hearing proceeded to 
conclusion without the Defendant ever knowing it was taking 
place or having the opportunity to be heard. Defendant would 
have appeared for said hearing had he been given the opportunity. 
Thereafter, the appeal process was begun in the Utah Court 
of Appeals and has proceeded ever since. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1) The Defendant employed counsel, Elizabeth Joseph, to 
represent him in the appeal of his conviction in the Justice 
Court in Kane County to the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County. 
Ms. Joseph knew, well in advance of the trial, of at least four 
witnesses who would corroborate the Defendant's version of the 
facts surrounding the incident which lead to the Defendant being 
charge with a criminal offense. Because trial had already been 
held in the Justice Court, she was also fully aware of the vic-
tim's expected testimony. She was provided with sufficient 
information to allow her to contact the Defendant's witnesses. 
She had, in fact, contacted two of those witnesses prior to 
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trial, one directly and one indirectly through his parents with 
whom he resided. The Defendant also demanded a jury trial, which 
Ms. Joseph determined, prior to trial and in the exercise of her 
independent judgment, and without the Defendant's consent, was 
not necessary. Ms. Joseph failed to subpoena any of the witnesses 
whose names had been provided by the Defendant, even though she 
was expecting the testimony of one, at least. Her failure to 
subpoena witnesses whose testimony she knew to be very material, 
relevant, and contrary to that of the alleged victim, failed to 
insure their appearance at trial and/or to provide a foundation 
for a motion to continue the trial should they fail to appear. 
When Defendant's witnesses did not appear, Defendant was left 
without any corroborating testimony and was in no better trial 
position than when he had been before the Justice Court, pro se. 
Ms. Joseph's performance was deficient when measured by any 
reasonable standard of professional performance and so prejudiced 
the defense as to deprive the Defendant of a fair trial. 
2) The Tenth Circuit Court erred in denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Conviction and to Grant a New Trial upon its 
finding that it had lost jurisdiction of this case because of the 
prior filLng of the Notice of Appeal by the Defendant in the Court 
of Appeals, when the Court of Appeal's own records reflect that 
said Notice was not filed in that Court until January A, 1988. 
3) The Defendant's rights to due process of law, as guaran-
teed by both the Utah and United States Constitutions, were denied 
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by the actions of the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County in 
failing to provide the Defendant with notice of the December 4, 
1987, hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Set 'Aside Conviction 
and to Grant a New Trial and, thus, denying the Defendant his 
right to appear and be heard. 
ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court, in its opinion in Strickland 
1* Washiington,466 U.S. 668 (1984) set forth a two pronged test 
which must be met in order to support a Defendant's claim that 
counsel's assistance was so defective as to require the reversal 
of a conviction. The first test is that "counsel's performance 
was deficient." The second test is that "the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial." The Court expanded that the proper standard for 
judging an attorney's performance is that of reasonable effective 
assistance, considering all of the circumstances. The Defendant 
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Further, the Court indicated that 
the distorting effects of hindsight should be eliminated in 
making a fair assessment of an attorney's performance. Rather, 
the conduct should be evaluated from counsel's perspective at 
the time of counsel's actions. The instant case presents a situa-
tion wherein the attorney for the Defendant was fully aware of 
the problems resulting in the trial at the Justice Court and that 
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the remedy to those problems was to present testimony from other 
independent witnesses contrary to the testimony of the alleged 
victim and consistent with the testimony of the Defendant. Counsel 
had more than adequate time and information to secure the atten-
dance of those witnesses through the subpoena powers of the Court. 
The necessity, importance, and significance of these witnesses 
and their testimony at trial should have been obvious to any 
licensed attorney and the failure to insure their attendance 
at trial falls below even the lowest objective standard of 
reasonableness that could conceivably be set. 
With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the Court 
further elaborated that the Defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, except for the errors of his counsel, 
the result of the trial would have been different. The Court 
further defines a reasonable probability as a probability which 
is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the hearing 
or trial. That translates very simply into a probability suffi-
cient to cause question as to the fundamental fairness of the pro-
ceeding whose result is being challenged. Defendant's position is 
that the existence of even one witness in addition to the Defendant 
whose testimony will contradict that of the alleged victim is suf-
ficient to meet the threshhold question concerning the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding. Exhibit A which is attached hereto 
and incorporated herein is the affidavit of one, Anthony Colaizzi, 
whose testimony would have clearly contradicted that of the alleged 
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victim and supported that of the Defendant. Exhibit B which is 
also attached hereto and incorporated herein is a letter from 
one, Mike Duran, reflecting like testimony. Exhibit C which is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein is a billing statement 
from Defendant's counsel to Defendant, reflecting a total of 
nineteen minutes of professional services provided by Defendant's 
counsel to Defendant between April A, 1987, and May 3, 1987, and 
reflects that counsel for the Defendant had directly contacted 
one of the witnesses and knew of the whereabouts and was able to 
contact a second witness. The first witness referred to by the 
Defendant's counsel in her billing statement, Kris Zolager, was 
expected to be present at court as indicated by defense counsel's 
note on her billing statement. It is a fair assumption and in-
ference that his testimony would also have been supportive of the 
Defendant's position. 
No hindsight is necessary at all to see the unprofessional 
errors on the part of Defendant's counsel and the deficiencies 
in her representation of the Defendant. 
The significance of the failure of Defendant's counsel to 
try this matter before a jury is not capable of being fully and 
fairly evaluated because of the extreme nature in defense counsel's 
errors in failing to subpoena Defendant's witnesses. 
In Exhibit D which is attached hereto and incorporated herein, 
the affidavit of Elizabeth Joseph, Defendant's counsel, Ms. Joseph 
indicates that she received permission from the Defendant's mother 
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that it was acceptable to not subpoena Mr. Zolager. On the other 
hand, Ms. Joseph indicates that she made the independent judgment 
concerning the vacating of the jury trial and obtained the approval 
of both the Defendant and Defendant's mother to simply try the 
matter to the court. Although Defendant and his mother would 
deny that allegation, it is somewhat inconsistent for counsel 
to make such a significant decision independently and to go 
forward and convince her client of the propriety of her decision, 
while avoiding the same or a similar approach with respect to the 
importance and significance of subpoenaeing witnesses necessary to 
the Defendant's case. If Ms. Joseph could have talked the Defen-
dant out of a jury trial, she certainly could have talked them 
into subpoenaeing witnesses had she properly and professionally 
evaluated that issue. 
Additionally, with respect to the credibility of the affidavit 
of Defendant's counsel, that affidavit, and paragraph 5 in particular 
seem to imply that Defendant's counsel was limited in her ability 
to locate the witnesses to only one of them. Her billing statement 
would at least indicate to the contrary. 
A consideration of all of the circumstances of this case 
leads to the conclusion that the performance of Defendant's 
counsel was deficient and that that deficient performance pre-
judiced the Defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. 
Defendant's rights, as argued above, are guaranteed to him 
by Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and Amendments V, 
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VI, and XIV of the United States Constitution* Consideration of 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is addressed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Malmrose(Utah 1982)649 P.2d 56, 
Codianna v. Morris (Utah 1983)660 P.2d 1101, and State v. Frame 
(Utah 1986) 723 P.2d 401. See also 74 A.L.R. 2d 1390. 
Although in its Order denying the Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial the Tenth Circuit Court 
indicated that the Defendant's Motion was not timely filed, the 
Court's order was based on the more significant finding that the 
Court was without jurisdiction. The timliness of the filing of 
Defendant's Motion is moot if the Court is without jurisdiction. 
Had the Court found that it had continuing jurisdiction, the 
question of the timliness of the Motion should have been dealt 
with pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which, in subsection (a) appears to grant 
the Court authority to order a new trial upon its own initiative 
without the time limits fixed upon the parties for filing motions 
requesting such a remedy. The Court's error in denying juris-
diction based on an erroneous date of filing of the Notice of 
Appeal renders that order in error, the January 8, 1988, letter 
from Julia Whitfield to the Defendant establishing a filing date 
of the Notice of Appeal significantly later than that indicated 
by the court. 
The Court's record reflects that no notice was provided to 
the Defendant concerning the December 4, 1987 # hearing upon 
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Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial. 
The Motion was not determined simply on the pleadings, as the Court's 
Order indicates that the Plaintiff was present in court and repre-
sented by the Kane County Attorney. Defendant had no actual or 
constructive notice concerning this hearing. 
The essentials of due process are set forth in the Court's 
opinion in Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P.2d 314. Two 
of the six essentials set forth are "(c) notice to the person of 
the inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes to be heard; and (d) right 
to appear in person or by counsel." Simply stated, the Defendant 
must have had notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard 
before he could have been bound by that order in light of the due 
process requirements. The Defendant's rights to due process of the 
law are guaranteed by Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
1) Defendant's constitutional rights pursuant to Amendments 
V, VI, and XIV of the United States Constitution and to Sections 
7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution were seriously and severely 
denied by the unprofessional errors of his counsel at trial, those 
errors establishing both the deficiency in his counsel's perfor-
mance and the prejudice to the Defendant's defense resulting in 
the Defendant being deprived of the fundamental fairness to which 
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he was entitled at trial. 
2) The actions of the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County 
in addressing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Conviction and 
Grant a New Trial were based upon erroneous facts and denied the 
Defendant his due process rights in failing to provide him notice 
of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that 
this Court enter its Order reversing the conviction previously 
entered against the Defendant in the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane 
County, Utah, and dismissing the charge against the Defendant. 
In the alternative, and at a minimum in theinterests of fundamental 
fairness as assured by the relevant constitutional provisions 
herein, the Court should reverse the conviction and remand the 
matter for a fair and impartial trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of April, 1988. 
ROBERT X MONSON 
Defendant Pro Se 
909 South 7th Street 
Montrose, Colorado 80401 
303/249-1089 
Proof of Service 
I hereby certify that I duly mailed (4) true and correct copies 
of the above Brief of Appellant this 29th day of April, 1988, to 
the Kane County Attorney, 70 North Main, Kanab, Utah, 84741, by 
depositing the same in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid. 
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BILL for PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
submi tted to: Robert Monson 
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£9 April telephone conference: Kris Zolager 
3 May trial preparation scheduling 
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CURRENT CREDIT: $249.91 
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osepii 
Attorney at Law 
Bob-~Zolager will be there; I haven't talked to Duran—he 
apparently comes home later than his parents are willing to have 
calls; I'll keep trying-
See you on the 15th. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• s • s • 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
ELIZABETH JOSEPH hereby states on her oath: 
1. That she is an attorney duly licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah. 
2. That she represented Robert J. Monson in his defense of 
a Class B misdemeanor charge of assault in a de novo appeal to 
the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County from a conviction on the 
charge in the Justice Court of Kane County. 
3. That throughout her representation of Mr. Monson, he was 
generally unavailable by telephone and he instructed Affiant that 
his mother Joanne could speak for him regarding decisions to be 
made in the case and that Affiant was to follow Mrs. Monson's 
directives. 
4. That Affiant estimates she had 30 to 40 telephone 
conferences with Mrs. Monson throughout the course of the case. 
5. That Mrs. Monson provided to Affiant the names of four 
witnesses to the incident giving rise to the charges against her 
son which she represented would substantiate his version of the 
incident. She, however, had no addresses for any of them and no 
last names for two of them. She provided one telephone number 
for one of them, a Chris Zolager, and indicated he could possibly 
provide locations for the others. 
6. That Mr. Zolager was not at the number provided by Mrs. 
Monson, but Affiant was referred to a series of other phone 
numbers, eventually reaching Mr. Zolager. 
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7. That Mr. Zolager told Affiant he did not know the 
location of the other witnesses. He indicated he would be 
available to testify. Affiant told him that with a subpoena, he 
would be entitled to witness fees and expenses but that the costs 
of service of that subpoena would have to be borne by Mr. Monson 
unless service could be effected when he came to the trial. Mr. 
Zolager said he did not wish to add to Mr. Monson's costs and 
promised he would appear to testify. Affiant and Mr. Zolager hac 
an extensive discussion about the date of trial, his plans for 
transportation, and the route to Kanab. 
8. That Affiant later confirmed by a telephone call to Mr. 
Zolager that he would attend the trial. 
9. That Affiant informed Mrs. Monson of the situation with* 
Mr. Zolager and the other witnesses, and she indicated the 
arrangements Affiant had made were satisfactory. 
10. That Affiant requested a jury trial on Mr. Monson's 
behalf when the trial date was set. 
11. That as Affiant prepared for trial, it was her judgment 
that the case would turn on the question of self-defense (which, 
in fact, it did). Affiant, having trial experience before Judge 
David L. Mower, determined Mr. Monson's chances of acquittal 
would be better if the matter was tried to the bench rather than 
to a jury. It was Affiant's judgment that Judge Mower is a 
meticulous jurist with great respect for legal principles and 
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that it would be easier to make a clean presentation of Mr. 
Monson's defense, which Affiant believed would enhance his 
chances of acquittal, to the bench rather than to a jury. 
12. That Affiant has extensive experience with Kane County 
juries, which tend to be conservative and prone to conviction in 
cases involving close calls. 
13. That Affiant obtained both Mrs. and Mr. Monson's 
clearance to withdraw the request for a jury. 
14. That the case against Mr. Monson focused on two events: 
two punches thrown by Mr. Monson following the victim pitching a 
drink in his face and Mr. Monson's subsequent removal of the 
victim from his property. 
15. That the Court found the first two punches were 
instinctive and beyond Mr. Monson's control but ruled the manner 
in which Mr. Monson removed the victim from his property 
constituted an assault. 
16. That the testimony indicated the victim sustained 
extensive dental damage in the fall he incurred when Mr. Monson 
removed him from his property. The victim's tooth was recovered 
by police officers at that site. The testimony was the victim 
was nearly unconscious when he was removed from the property. 
17. That on cross-examination, Mr. Monson admitted to 
several other incidents where he had resorted to physical 
violence although he maintained they were all self-defense. 
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18. That it is Affiant's judgment that Mr. Monson received a 
fair trial with adequate and competent representation. Affiant 
fully concurred in all the decisions made by Affiant which he is 
now criticizing. 
DATED this 26th day of February 1988. 
ELIZABETH JOSEPH* 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF KANE 
S. S. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of February 
1988. 
J^IVJ1- -1^ 5- 1 
NOTARY ^ PUBLIC residing at Big Water 
my, commission expires 8-12-89 
